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I. INTRODUCTION
Nineteen-year-old Hong Ying Gao was worth $2,200.1 Her estimated
value did not reflect her life savings, but rather described a purchase cost:
Ms. Gao was a paid-for bride in a Chinese village.2 While her fiancé’s
money settled debts for Ms. Gao’s family of struggling fishermen, the
marriage transaction forced Ms. Gao into the arms of an abusive man who
fed his bad temperament with gambling.3 Ms. Gao’s fiancé beat her,
threatened her, and harassed her parents when she refused to marry him.4
Ms. Gao finally escaped to another village, but when her fiancé found her
and continued to threaten her family, Ms. Gao fled to the United States to
escape him.5 The U.S. government, however, denied Ms. Gao asylum
because the judicially-created ordinary remand rule required deference to
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which found that
Ms. Gao could return safely to China.6
This Note argues that the Second Circuit properly exercised its power to
review the BIA decision without remanding to the BIA for reconsideration

1. See Warren Richey, Does the Prospect of Arranged Marriage and Abuse
Warrant Asylum in the U.S.?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 23, 2007, at 1 (reporting
that Ms. Gao’s mother sold her and used the money to pay the family’s expenses).
2. See id. (describing Ms. Gao’s membership in a group of rural Chinese women
forced into marriage due to economic strife).
3. See id. (explaining that Ms. Gao sought asylum because she feared further
abuse and harassment by her fiancé).
4. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, Keisler v. Hong
Ying Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345 (2007) (explaining that Ms. Gao could not find refuge within
China because her fiancé threatened her and her family with violence or arrest).
5. See Richey, supra note 1, at 1 (implying that Ms. Gao had no hope of avoiding
an abusive marriage other than to seek asylum in the United States).
6. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 65 (evidencing the danger of allowing complete deference
to an agency when that agency reaches a conclusion seemingly inconsistent with the
facts provided).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss4/4

2

Finn: Save Me From Harm: The Consequences of the Ordinary Remand Rule's

2008]

SAVE ME FROM HARM

529

of the contested issues, and asserts that the Supreme Court erroneously
applied the ordinary remand rule to Ms. Gao’s case. Part II provides
background on the ordinary remand rule, judicial deference, and judicial
review, as well as the factual history of Ms. Gao’s case.7
This Note contends that although asylum determinations and equal
protection classifications are separate areas of the law, similar standards
should apply to group classifications made by agencies or courts. Part
III.A critiques the Supreme Court’s reliance on the ordinary remand rule
because not all BIA decisions receive high degrees of deference, and more
importantly, the courts and agencies both have expertise in protecting
specific social groups.8 Part III.B argues that the Court created bad
precedent in refusing to uphold the Second Circuit’s decision, obscuring
when and why a court should apply the rule.9 Part III.C recommends that
the Court modify the application of the ordinary remand rule to protect the
role of judicial review and to follow international humanitarian laws, such
as the Vienna Convention, that address violence against women.10 Part
III.D suggests ways for Congress to streamline adjudication of genderbased asylum claims.11 Finally, Part IV concludes that the rule undermines
the important practice of judicial review, hurts a refugee’s chances of being
granted asylum, and decreases the nation’s reputational capital in the
international humanitarian arena.12
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Asylum Process
An immigrant to the United States can, during deportation proceedings,
raise asylum as a defense against removal from the United States.13 An
7. See infra Part II (detailing the relationship between the ordinary remand rule’s
rationale and its application to Ms. Gao’s case).
8. See infra Part III(A) (discrediting the Supreme Court’s reliance on the expertise
rationale for the rule because federal courts often decide protected class
determinations).
9. See infra Part III(B) (arguing that because the Supreme Court has refused to
address varying interpretations of the rule, it has confused the rule’s meaning and
correct application).
10. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12,
1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration] (ushering in reforms to better address
discrimination against women).
11. See infra Part III(D) (recommending that Congress amend immigration laws to
reflect a clearly defined relationship between gender-based harms and persecution).
12. See infra Part IV (concluding that the rule falls short of the “spirit of the law”
because it often refuses immigrants protection from a country that has the capacity to
grant it).
13. See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Obtaining Asylum in
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Immigration Judge (IJ) makes a final determination in an adversarial
hearing as to the immigrant’s eligibility for asylum.14 Eligibility depends
upon the immigrant’s status as a refugee, which the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) defines as any person unable or unwilling to return
to his or her country of origin because of a “well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”15 The IJ will only deport an
applicant that he or she classifies as a refugee if an internal safe harbor
exists in the applicant’s home country.16
An applicant can, however, appeal the IJ’s decision to the BIA.17 The
BIA reviews the IJ’s eligibility ruling and decides to uphold or reverse it.18
A federal circuit court can review the BIA’s decision and remand it to the
BIA for reconsideration consistent with the court’s opinion.19 Generally, a
the United States: Two Paths, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “Services
and Benefits” hyperlink; then follow “Humanitarian Benefits” hyperlink; follow
“Asylum” hyperlink; then click on the hyperlink “Two Paths to Asylum”) (last visited
Sept. 4, 2008) [hereinafter USCIS] (explaining the process by which asylum
applications come before an Immigration Judge (IJ)).
14. See id. (distinguishing the adversarial, defensive asylum process from the nonadversarial, affirmative asylum interview process, where applicants who are not
involved in removal proceedings submit an asylum application to the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)).
15. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (defining
the term “refugee” as requiring a close nexus between persecution and the asylum
applicant’s race, membership in a particular social group, etc., yet failing to define
“persecution” or “particular social group”); see also Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
433 F.3d 332, 340-41 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that definitions of persecution range
from physical harm based upon political or religious beliefs to non-violent abuse based
upon an immutable characteristic); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1992)
(defining particular social group as a “collection of people closely affiliated who are
actuated by some common impulse or interest, or who share a fundamental [trait]”).
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2008) (entitling an asylum applicant to a stay of
removal when the applicant shows that persecution is more likely than not to occur
upon return to the applicant’s home country).
17. See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals,
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Board of
Immigration Appeals] (noting that the BIA’s decisions are still subject to judicial
review in court); Executive Office for Immigration Review, Statistical Year Book A1,
S1-2, Feb. 2007, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy06syb.pdf (last
visited Sept. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Statistical Year Book] (summarizing the caseload of
the IJ and the BIA and noting the number and reason for appeals from the IJ to the
BIA).
18. See Board of Immigration Appeals, supra note 17, at S1-2 (stating that the BIA
does not need to review all IJ decisions because the exercise of jurisdiction is
discretionary).
19. See, e.g., Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 923 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006)
(assessing the reasonableness of a BIA and IJ decision denying asylum to a man who
opposed Yemeni Communist forces); Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 305, 310-11
(5th Cir. 2005) (reversing a BIA decision because a man would face persecution based
upon his practice of Falun Gong upon return to China); Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392
F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2004) (remanding with directions to recognize that a man
threatened by guerrillas would face persecution upon return to Guatemala).
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court does not review the BIA’s decisions de novo because principles of
administrative law demand that most BIA decisions receive deference.20
Courts generally trust the BIA to make initial asylum determinations
because the BIA is a specialized administrative body.21
B. Deference to the BIA
The degree of deference afforded to BIA decisions is not consistent.22
The highest degree of deference, established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
National Resource Defense Council, attaches to an agency decision when
Congress has expressly or impliedly delegated decision-making authority
to an agency whose decision is reasonable and carries the force of law.23
When an agency’s decision lacks the force of law, the court instead grants
respect to the decision based upon its reasonableness, thoroughness, and
persuasiveness.24 The Supreme Court described this lower level of
deference in Skidmore v. Swift.25
Beyond Skidmore, deference to an adjudicatory determination generally
disappears in the face of a more searching review of the record.26 In a
practice known as “substantial evidence” review, the court examines the
20. See INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (rationalizing remand
because the BIA possesses expertise that the courts lack in determining the significance
of political change in foreign nations to an immigrant’s life).
21. See ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 5 (5th ed. 2006) (considering agencies to be “experts”
because, unlike courts, agencies employ experts to keep abreast of developments and
technical changes in their fields).
22. Compare Castaneda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2007)
(remanding to allow the BIA to address errors of suspect reasoning and unsubstantiated
findings with respect to its conclusion that a Peruvian man was not eligible for asylum
because he had participated in a massacre), with Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 824
(7th Cir. 2007) (directing the BIA to grant another hearing to a Cambodian man
seeking asylum due to his fear of persecution based on his political beliefs).
23. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 86566 (1984) (requiring deference to EPA’s interpretation of “stationary source” because
the Clean Air Act was ambiguous as to the term’s meaning and the EPA’s definition
was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion); see also Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that agency opinion letters about compensatory time
do not deserve Chevron deference because the letters lack the force of law afforded to
rules or regulations).
24. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (noting that a
government guidance document concerning the Fair Labor Standards Act’s application
to employers and employees deserved respect because guidance documents reflect
professional judgment and experience).
25. See id. (explaining that a court grants Skidmore deference to agency
interpretations that lack the force of law and noting that the level of respect depends
upon the thoroughness of review, the quality of reasoning, and consistency with earlier
policy).
26. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (describing a refusal to
grant deference to an agency decision when the evidence compelled a completely
different result).
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evidence to determine whether a reasonable person looking at the entire
record would find that the evidence supported the decision.27 Substantial
evidence review frequently occurs when the BIA summarily affirms an IJ’s
ruling.28 Where the BIA simply adopts an IJ’s decision as its own without
additional explanation, the level of deference is decreased because the BIA
decision does not always appear well reasoned, thorough, or consistent
with the record.29
C. The Ordinary Remand Rule
Recently, the Supreme Court has relied on more than Chevron or
Skidmore deference to protect BIA decisions from searching judicial
review by implementing a judicially created doctrine known as the ordinary
remand rule.30 Absent rare circumstances, a case triggers the rule when the
BIA has not yet reviewed or decided the issues before the court; the rule
mandates that a federal court remand the case to the agency without any
direction as to how the agency should find.31 The rationale behind the rule
is that administrative agencies should have the chance to voice their
expertise and evaluate evidence in light of that expertise before a circuit
court reviews the case.32
The Supreme Court most recently explained the rule in Gonzales v.
Thomas.33 Michelle Thomas, a white woman living in South Africa with
her family, feared persecution from black South Africans because
27. See Alvarado-Carillo v. INS, 251 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 2001) (defining
“substantial evidence” as more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence supporting the IJ’s
decision).
28. See Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 190-91 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting
the argument that BIA summary affirmations of IJ decisions receive deference because
they are not the type of reasoned and well-articulated decisions that would normally
trigger Chevron or Skidmore deference).
29. See id. (refusing to uphold the BIA’s grant of asylum eligibility to a man whose
fiancé the government forcefully sterilized because the BIA’s decision did not
sufficiently explain the application of spousal eligibility to boyfriends).
30. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 184 (2006) (refusing to uphold the
Ninth Circuit’s grant of asylum to family members of a white, racist South African
man because the BIA had yet to consider whether kinship ties constituted a protected
social group).
31. See INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 15, 18 (2002) (remanding to the BIA
because the BIA, who possessed expertise in the matter, had not determined if
conditions in Guatemala had changed enough to permit a political dissident’s safe
return). But see Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007) (ruling
that the rare circumstances exception to the rule applied because the court decided a
legal, not factual, issue concerning sufficient allegations of errors).
32. See Thomas, 547 U.S. at 186-87 (arguing that an agency should make initial
determinations regarding issues before courts because application of an agency’s
specialized knowledge provides the court with informed discussion and analysis in later
stages of litigation).
33. See id. (remanding to the BIA, who had yet to decide if “kinship ties”
constituted a “particular social group”).
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Thomas’s father-in-law was a white man who had abused black workers.34
While the BIA refused to grant Thomas asylum, the Ninth Circuit found
that Thomas’s relationship to her father-in-law constituted membership in a
particular social group, which qualified her and her family for asylum.35
On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the BIA, explaining
that the BIA, rather than the Ninth Circuit, should first review whether
“kinship ties” constituted membership in a particular social group.36
D. Gao v. Gonzales
In October 2007, the Court again invoked the ordinary remand rule,
relying only on Thomas for support.37 The case concerned Hong Ying Gao,
who sought escape from an abusive forced marriage in China.38 Though
she presented compelling evidence to the contrary, her IJ refused to find
that she belonged to a particular social group.39 When Ms. Gao appealed
the decision to the BIA, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without
explanation.40 Ms. Gao sought judicial review of the decision in the
Second Circuit.41 The court refused to afford Chevron or Skidmore
deference to the BIA ruling because the BIA had summarily affirmed the IJ
decision. The court, therefore, reviewed the IJ’s decision using the
substantial evidence standard and found the BIA’s decision contrary to all
evidence presented in the record.42
34. See id. at 184-85 (laying the foundation for asylum based upon membership in
a particular social group due to Thomas’s race and kinship with a man who abused
black workers).
35. See id. at 186-87 (implying that the court usurped the BIA’s role by deciding
that Thomas’s family ties with a racist man qualified her for asylum before the BIA
decided that issue specifically).
36. See id. (applying the ordinary remand rule because the Court found the BIA
had not yet exercised the opportunity to provide expertise and input on the social group
classification).
37. See Keisler v. Hong Ying Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345, 345 (2007) (asserting that the
BIA should decide the case because the BIA has more experience in immigration and
asylum issues).
38. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 71 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, Keisler v. Hong
Ying Gao 128 S. Ct. 345 (2007) (arguing that Ms. Gao was a refugee because she
suffered persecution based upon her sex and membership in a group of paid-for brides
who lived under a regime that enforced involuntary marriages).
39. See id. at 68-70 (noting the IJ’s refusal to find Ms. Gao’s position as a paid-for
bride similar to other recognized social groups, such as African females fearing
circumcision, because the IJ felt the source of her fears was domestic, not cultural).
40. See id. at 65-66 (stating that BIA summary affirmations do not require the same
degree of deference as well-reasoned decisions).
41. See id. at 64 (explaining that judicial review of the BIA’s decision was
warranted because courts review arbitrary or capricious decisions); see also Stephen H.
Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits of
Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 463 (2007) (noting that judicial review is important
for checks and balances).
42. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 71 (using the substantial evidence standard to find that,
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Acknowledging that the INA defined its “particular social group”
standard poorly, the Second Circuit relied on a large body of case law to
define persecution on account of membership in a particular social group.43
The court held that persecution exists when an applicant fears present or
future abuse based upon an innate, immutable trait that defines the
applicant’s identity.44 Such characteristics include race, gender, kin
relationships, and past experiences shared among applicants.45 The Second
Circuit concluded that Ms. Gao was the same sex as the paid-for brides,
and also shared the trait of being sold into marriage in a community that
enforces those marriages.46 The court reasoned that Ms. Gao would face
persecution in the form of an interminable, involuntary marriage due to her
membership in an identifiable social group that consisted of paid-for brides
who live in economically disadvantaged communities where the Chinese
government condones and enforces involuntary marriage contracts.47
Furthermore, the Second Circuit overruled the BIA’s affirmation of the
IJ’s decision that the police could adequately protect Ms. Gao and that she
could find refuge in China.48 The record, in fact, reflected Ms. Gao’s
because Ms. Gao produced evidence of bride-trafficking in Chinese villages and of her
inability to find refuge in China, the evidence compelled asylum). But see INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 486 (1992) (holding that an asylum applicant who feared
conscription by guerrillas failed to provide evidence of politically motivated
persecution because the applicant only feared retaliation against his parents).
43. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 67 (implying that Ms. Gao deserved protection because
her position as a paid-for bride was similar to other already protected groups, such as
Mexican transvestites, Cuban homosexual males, and women fearing genital
mutilation); see also Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 796-98 (9th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing that women fearing genital mutilation are eligible for asylum based upon
their membership in a particular social group).
44. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 68 (explaining that persecution may exist where the fear
of future persecution is slight, though discernable, and noting that, where the applicant
shows that future persecution is more likely to occur than not, the applicant qualifies
for automatic withholding of removal); see also In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 23234 (B.I.A. 1985) (finding a taxi-driver who refused to join a strike ineligible for asylum
because his gender was insufficient to place him in a social group and his position as a
taxi driver was not immutable).
45. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 67 (arguing that a refugee’s sex should qualify him or her
for gender-based asylum because sex is an immutable trait); see also HernandezMontiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that gay Mexican
transvestites belong to a particular social group because police abuse them due to their
sexuality); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996) (recognizing
females who fear genital mutilation as asylum-worthy based upon a reasonable fear of
future persecution because they belong to a group of Tchamba-Kunsuntu women who
have been mutilated and who oppose the practice).
46. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 71 (refusing to give deference to the IJ’s decision because
it lacked valid explanations for its conclusions).
47. See id. (noting that Ms. Gao belonged to a social group defined by gender and
involuntary servitude in the form of a forced marriage, and finding a connection
between that group classification and persecution because the group existed in a
community where government officials support and enforce marriage contracts
between men and paid-for brides).
48. See id. (explaining that a denial of asylum based upon internal refuge requires
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inability to escape her fiancé’s harassment and Ms. Gao’s reasonable fear
that, if she remained in China, her fiancé’s friends in the police force would
arrest her out of spite.49 Thus, the court vacated the BIA’s affirmation of
the IJ’s decision and remanded Ms. Gao’s case back to the BIA for further
review consistent with the court’s opinion.50
Ms. Gao’s victory, however, never materialized. The Supreme Court
reversed the Second Circuit’s opinion, finding that, despite the experience
federal judges have in determining group classifications in equal protection
cases, the court could not compel the BIA to find that Ms. Gao belonged to
a particular social group.51 The Court held instead that the ordinary remand
rule required the BIA to decide Ms. Gao’s group membership first.52
Remand to the BIA, however, ignored obligations to aid refugees because it
likely returned Ms. Gao to her abuser.53 Nor did the Court explain the
that refuge actually be available).
49. See id. at 69 (noting that asylum can be denied when refuge in the home
country is a reasonable alternative to living in the United States); see also INS v.
Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 13 (2002) (holding that refuge in Guatemala existed
because threats the applicant faced were not due to his political opinion).
50. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 71 (finding that Ms. Gao belonged to a particular social
group because she shared traits with other impoverished Chinese paid-for brides); see
also International Marriage Broker Regulation Act, 8 U.S.C. 1375 (2004), repealed
and incorporated within the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1375a (2006) [hereinafter IMBRA] (forcing American citizens engaged to foreign
nationals to disclose violent histories to potential mates through “marriage brokers”);
European Connections & Tours, Inc. v. Gonzales, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1362-63
(N.D. Ga. 2007) (confirming that IMBRA sought to protect a group consisting of mailorder brides); IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICES, INTERNATIONAL
MATCHMAKING ORGANIZATIONS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1999) [hereinafter IMO
REPORT] (explaining that an unregulated marriage brokerage industry is conducive to
exploitation of immigrant women); Arin Greenwood, For Mail-Order Brides, Happily
Ever After, 94 A.B.A. J. 14 (Feb. 2008) (estimating the number of paid-for brides
entering the country on fiancée visas to be 11,000 to 16,500 women per year).
51. See Keisler v. Hong Ying Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345, 375 (2007) (remanding based
upon Thomas’s expertise rationale for the rule, which would uphold alleged BIA
expertise in making protected class decisions). But see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (holding that because sex, like race and national origin, is
an involuntary, immutable trait bearing no relationship to legal burden, a law providing
different benefits based upon gender was invalid); Strauder v. West Va., 100 U.S. 303,
312 (1879) (invalidating a law limiting jury service to white men because it excluded
black men, a protected class).
52. See Keisler, 128 S. Ct. at 345 (conflating Ms. Gao’s case with Gonzales v.
Thomas in order to invoke the ordinary remand rule, arguably because both cases
concerned membership in particular social groups); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183,
186 (2006) (implying that courts should not overturn BIA asylum decisions because the
BIA has been explicitly tasked with ruling on asylum claims).
53. See, e.g., Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees: Chapter 1, Article 2, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter U.N. Refugee Protocol]
(requiring signatories to uphold humanitarian duties to protect refugees from abuse in
their home countries); Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guideline 4: Women
Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Guidelines Issued by the
Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, Update, Nov. 13, 1996,
Section III, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/policy/guidelines/women_e.htm
[hereinafter Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada] (defining the link between
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inapplicability of judicial review or acknowledge the abuse Ms. Gao
suffered.54
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court Erred by Applying the Ordinary Remand Rule to
Ms. Gao’s Case Because the Second Circuit Rightly Exercised its Power to
Review the BIA’s Decision
The ordinary remand rule should not require that a federal court remand
a case to the BIA when the BIA already has voiced its opinion on a
particular issue.55 In fact, circuit courts have begun to distinguish their
cases from Thomas, usually by finding a rare or special circumstance that
permits the court to retain jurisdiction over the issue.56 The most frequent
use of a “special exception” occurs when the reviewing court finds that the
BIA already contemplated the issue before the court, and so the court sees
no reason to remand to the BIA for further reconsideration.57
B. The Rule Does Not Apply Automatically to Cases like Ms. Gao’s, Where
the BIA Already Had an Opportunity to Review an Asylum Eligibility Issue
The ordinary remand rule should not bind circuit court action where the
BIA waives its responsibility to apply agency expertise to an asylum
eligibility issue.58 When the BIA chooses not to review certain matters and
gender, persecution, and particular social group).
54. See Keisler, 128 S. Ct. at 345 (ignoring that Ms. Gao’s return to China
promised continued physical and emotional abuse); see also Rhonda Copelon,
Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 354 (1994) (claiming that domestic violence amounts to torture
and, therefore, victims of domestic violence should receive automatic protection);
Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or
Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 138-39 (2007) (discussing
the effect that abuse has on a woman’s life and her position in society); Danette
Gómez, Comment, Last in Line – United States Trails Behind in Recognizing GenderBased Asylum Claims, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 959, 979 (2004) (arguing that the United
States fails to fulfill its humanitarian duties because it often fails to protect women
seeking gender-based asylum).
55. See, e.g., Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2006) (implying
that allowing the Supreme Court to clamor for remand to the BIA, when the BIA
already had the opportunity to decide an issue, seems unfair and illogical).
56. See Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 311 (5th Cir. 2005) (evidencing the
consequences of the BIA’s initial review of an issue because, once reviewed, the court
may retain jurisdiction over that issue to ensure the BIA’s decision was not arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion).
57. See id. at 310 (explaining that the discretion promised to the BIA is not so
broad as to allow the BIA to reject a Falun Gong member’s application by dismissing
new, albeit similar, evidence as redundant, and supporting the decision to retain
jurisdiction by reminding the BIA that it already had an opportunity to review the new
evidence, yet failed to do so of its own accord).
58. See, e.g., id. at 311 (articulating that the ordinary remand rule is precatory,
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summarily affirms an IJ decision, the BIA cannot later demand the rule’s
protections of agency skill and initial input.59 The Supreme Court ignored
the BIA’s refusal to produce a more detailed opinion in Ms. Gao’s case.60
Instead, the Court gave only a superficial mention of expertise and failed to
address any special circumstances that might have negated application of
the ordinary remand rule.61 The Court’s insistence on application of the
rule without further clarification in Ms. Gao’s case, condones a practice
that permits remand to the BIA, even when the agency has already waived
any exercise of its own expertise by summarily affirming an IJ’s suspect
opinion.62
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s decision does not explain or even
acknowledge that a plain-text reading of the rule does not require the
remand of every asylum claim to the BIA.63 Rather, the rule protects the
BIA’s role only insofar as it provides the BIA with assurance that it will
have the opportunity to review threshold asylum issues before courts
address them.64 For example, in Zhao v. Gonzales, the court held that
where the BIA refuses to review issues before it, such as “changed
circumstances” in relation to persecution of Falun Gong followers, the
court can rule on that issue without usurping the BIA’s role.65
Although Ms. Gao’s case concerned membership in a particular social
particularly in a case where the BIA has already rendered a decision and the court’s
ruling does not impinge on the BIA’s authority to review an issue in the first instance).
59. See, e.g., Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the court could review and reverse the BIA’s denial of the applicant’s
asylum eligibility if that decision was manifestly contrary to law, and because the
record compelled the finding that the applicant would be subject to persecution on
account of his religion if he returned to Eritrea).
60. See Keisler v. Hong Ying Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345, 345 (2007) (supporting the BIA
practice of summary affirmation, even though that practice produced an opinion that
belittled Ms. Gao’s suffering).
61. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 187 (2006) (obscuring ordinary remand
rule jurisprudence by failing to define what special circumstances would permit a court
to review the BIA’s decision de novo).
62. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, Keisler v. Hong
Ying Gao 128 S. Ct. 345 (2007) (suggesting the importance of the BIA’s affirmation of
the IJ decision because, once the BIA has reviewed an issue, that issue becomes
available for judicial review in the federal courts without attachment of the automatic
remand requirement).
63. See Thomas, 547 U.S. at 186 (demanding an automatic remand to the BIA
because the Ninth Circuit decided whether a “kinship group” qualified as a particular
social group before the BIA could consider the issue). But see Zhao v. Gonzales, 404
F.3d 295, 311 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that, while the language of the rule is strong,
the text of the rule does not require the BIA to re-review each issue that has come
before it or reconsider any issue that it previously reviewed in a cursory manner).
64. See, e.g., Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2006)
(lambasting the claim that the ordinary remand rule should apply where the BIA has
already decided an issue before the court).
65. See Zhao, 404 F.3d at 301, 311 (noting that courts will not uphold BIA
decisions that are contrary to law, arbitrary, capricious, or abuses of discretion).
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group, rather than changed circumstances, the BIA already had exercised
review over her social group classification before the Second Circuit
considered it.66 Thus, as recognized in Zhao, the ordinary remand rule
should not demand that the BIA re-evaluate an issue on which it already
reached an objectionable conclusion.67 The Supreme Court, therefore,
should not have required that the Second Circuit remand to the BIA.68
Moreover, remand to the agency for further explanation would have been
inefficient because returning the case to the BIA docket would tax both
judicial and agency resources.69 Furthermore, remand seems unwarranted
because a court’s finding that a party suffers persecution or discrimination
based upon membership in a protected class should end the inquiry into
that party’s asylum status.70
C. The Courts, as Well as the BIA, Have Expertise in Making Protected
Class Determinations and that Expertise Should be Respected
The Supreme Court erred by relying so heavily on the BIA’s proficiency
in asylum matters because the knowledge relevant to Ms. Gao’s case
relates to making protected class determinations, an area in which the
courts are greater experts.71 Arguing that agency expertise trumps court
expertise in making distinctions of “particular social groups” is semantics.72
66. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 65 (reasoning that the BIA passed on the opportunity to
discuss more fully Ms. Gao’s membership in a particular social group when it
summarily affirmed the IJ’s denial of asylum for Ms. Gao).
67. See Zhao, 404 F.3d at 311 (implying that overzealous use of the rule hinders a
court’s ability to perform important judicial review functions).
68. Compare Gao, 440 F.3d at 71 (criticizing the expertise rationale for the
ordinary remand rule because the BIA already had the opportunity to exercise its
expertise in determining applicants who qualify for asylum based upon membership in
a particular social group, and yet opted to forego application of that expertise to Ms.
Gao’s case), with Zhao, 404 F.3d at 311 (refusing to apply the ordinary remand rule on
the issue of changed circumstances because the court found that the BIA had already
reviewed that issue, albeit in a cursory fashion).
69. See Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the
frequent failures of the IJ and the BIA to exercise an appropriate degree of care in their
asylum decisions can be explained, though not justified, by an overloaded docket at the
agency, and applying that observation to a case where the BIA questionably denied
asylum to a Cambodian political dissident because the BIA gave too much weight to
trivial inconsistencies, harmless exaggerations, and innocent mistakes in his
testimony).
70. See, e.g., Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2004)
(demonstrating that, because the applicant provided evidence of certain future
persecution based upon his religious beliefs, the court did not need to remand to the
BIA for reconsideration of his claims because no conclusion other than a grant of
asylum was possible).
71. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 70 (deriding the opinion of the IJ that found that the
monetary exchange between Ms. Gao’s family and her fiancé evidenced a strictly
familial conflict, and criticizing the IJ and BIA for ignoring the U.S. government’s
concession that forced marriage is an abuse that amounts to persecution).
72. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681-83 (1973) (classifying women
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Classifying the group as a “particular social group” rather than a “protected
class” does not change the basic intellectual foundation of the exercise.73
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has refused to abandon its dogged
adherence to the idea that the BIA can best decide “particular social group”
classifications.74 The Court has failed to acknowledge that the BIA is not
the only governmental body that can bring expertise to bear on class
determinations, particularly where those classifications turn on race,
sexuality, or gender.75 The Supreme Court should not disturb the Second
Circuit’s ruling that Ms. Gao belonged to a persecuted, particular social
group because the federal courts possess extensive experience in
determining the legal consequences of assigning a litigant to a protected
class.76 For example, in Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court concluded
that discrimination against the litigant impermissibly stemmed only from
an immutable characteristic: his race.77
More akin to the sex-based categorization in Ms. Gao’s case, the Court
in Frontiero v. Richardson considered gender classifications and struck
interchangeably as belonging to a “group,” “class,” or “sex-based classification,” any
of which the law views as suspect when legislation purports to treat the class differently
based solely upon sex).
73. Compare Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 796-98 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that female genital mutilation performed on a Somalian asylum applicant
qualified as a lifelong source of persecution which was dependent upon the applicant’s
gender and that the applicant was therefore eligible for asylum), with Frontiero, 411
U.S. at 684-86 (deriding the ways in which men have historically used “romantic
paternalism” to persecute women for being women, such as resigning them to the
hearth, forbidding them from holding office or title to property, denying them
education and the right to vote, and, as such, ruling that a law or regulation could not
discriminate against women based upon their gender).
74. See Keisler v. Hong Ying Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345, 345 (2007) (remanding Ms.
Gao’s case to the BIA and refusing to use the case to address issues such as
international humanitarian obligations and appropriate application of the ordinary
remand rule).
75. Compare Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006)
(citing immutable characteristics, such as race or nationality, as reasons one might be
persecuted and considered a refugee), and Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186
(2006) (basing remand on the idea that the BIA is the governmental body best equipped
to make decisions concerning refugee status because the BIA is the highest
administrative body tasked with deciding immigration issues), with Frontiero, 411 U.S.
at 682 (comparing the trait of sex to race and national origin insofar as those traits are
used to group people into classes whose rights the government stringently protects,
absent compelling justification to the contrary).
76. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (holding that the United States cannot
apportion benefits differently to the spouse of a military serviceman or woman based
upon the sex of that member’s spouse); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312
(1879) (finding that a law limiting jury participation to white men violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it discriminated against the class of black men who could
also be jury members).
77. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308 (ruling that race has no relation to legal
responsibilities and forbidding the adverse treatment of a people based upon their race
because such treatment implies inferiority and subjugates their rights to those of
others).
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down the discriminatory provision of health benefits to members of the
U.S. military based upon the beneficiary’s gender.78 Just as in Ms. Gao’s
case, where the Second Circuit determined how Ms. Gao’s gender related
to her group membership, the Court in both Strauder and Frontiero began
legal analysis with a delineation of factors, race and gender, that formed the
basis for protected class membership.79 Then, just as the Court in Strauder
and Frontiero established an impermissible nexus between discrimination
and the immutable characteristic constituting class membership, the Second
Circuit also decided that Ms. Gao’s gender related to her persecution in the
form of forced marriage.80
Furthermore, reliance on the expertise argument for the ordinary remand
rule ignores that the judicial and legislative branches of the federal
government already recognize protected classes similar to Ms. Gao’s in the
context of asylum law, such as women fearing culturally-supported female
genital mutilation and foreign women who come to the United States as
“mail-order brides.”81 For example, although the court in Mohammed v.
Gonzales recognized opposition to certain cultural practices, such as female
circumcision, as supporting a grant of asylum, the Supreme Court failed to

78. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (reasoning that women belonged to a protected
class based upon a characteristic that they did not choose, nor could they reasonably
change, and, as such, holding that women could not be discriminated against based
upon their gender).
79. Compare Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, Keisler v.
Hong Ying Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345 (2007) (determining that Ms. Gao’s social group
classification rests upon a detailed analysis of facts unique to her case because many
different traits trigger classification), with Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310 (using a case-bycase analysis to invalidate a jury limitation based upon race because some limited
classifications pass constitutional muster), and Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (explaining
that classifications based upon traits that bear no relationship to an ability to perform or
function in society are subject to searching review).
80. Compare Gao, 440 F.3d at 71 (noting that Ms. Gao’s gender inextricably
linked her to future persecution in the form of an involuntary marriage because only
women could belong to a group of paid-for brides), with Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310
(invalidating a law that refused a black man the opportunity to have black jury
members because the law’s purpose was to discriminate against African-Americans
solely based upon their race), and Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690 (condemning a benefits
plan that gave different benefits to different parties because the divergent dissemination
of benefits rested upon no ground other than the gender of the parties).
81. See European Connections & Tours, Inc. v. Gonzales, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1355,
1363 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (conceding that foreign mail-order brides suffer a potentially
increased risk of domestic violence because they lack the knowledge or assertiveness to
speak out against their fiancés’ abusive behaviors); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357,
358, 361 (B.I.A. 1996) (recognizing Tchamba-Kunsuntu women who have not yet been
victims of genital mutilation, but who oppose the practice, as members of a particular
social group because female circumcision is extremely painful and enduring, as it
involves cutting the genitals with knives and often produces infection, shock, and
permanent damage to the urethra and anus); see also Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225
F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that in Mexico, gay men with female sexual
identities can be classified as belonging to a particular social group because law
enforcement officials often sexually abuse these men due to their sexuality).
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recognize a similar opposition to a cultural practice in Ms. Gao’s case.82
Although Ms. Gao’s fear is not of female genital mutilation, her fear is
similar: Ms. Gao opposes the cultural practice of forced marriage,
especially because her marriage promised to be interminable, violent, and
abusive.83 Ms. Gao also shares the immutable characteristic of gender with
women who are victims of mutilation.84 More importantly, the BIA’s
affirmation that Ms. Gao did not belong to a particular social group is
unreasonable, particularly because, similar to women living in areas where
female genital mutilation occurs, Ms. Gao resides under a governmental
structure that enforces and approves of involuntary marriages.85 Thus, had
the Court more keenly recognized the similarities between the two groups
of women, it would have seen that Ms. Gao belonged to a particular social
group of paid-for brides, pushed by a government-supported enforcement
regime into a class specifically due to her gender, and that she faced painful
and continuing abuse based upon the group in which she is a member.86
Women fleeing female genital mutilation are not the only group of
women protected by the United States. Recent legislation passed by
Congress attempted to address abuses suffered by mail-order brides.87
82. Compare Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 796-99 (9th Cir. 2005)
(finding that because 98% of Somalian female villagers suffered threats of female
genital mutilation, Somalian females, like Asian females fearing or subject to forced
sterilization, constituted a class worthy of protection because they suffered persecution
based upon their gender, plus persecution in the form of a dangerous, painful cultural
practice), with Gomez v. INS, 947 F.3d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that the
applicant, who had been raped by Salvadoran guerrillas as a young girl, could not
establish that she belonged to a “collection of people closely affiliated” who shared a
fundamental characteristic because no evidence suggested a systematic targeting of
young girls in El Salvador for rape, nor could she show that she would be singled out
for attack were she to return to El Salvador in the future).
83. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 64 (upholding the premise that “particular social group”
may be broadly construed to encompass the shared trait of gender, so long as the group
also shares another involuntary characteristic that is identifiable to persecutors, such as
Ms. Gao’s position as a paid-for bride).
84. Compare id. at 71 (finding that Ms. Gao meets the “gender plus” classification
for a protected group because she shares more than just her sex with her group; she also
shares a common plight, which is beyond her ability to ameliorate), with In re Acosta,
19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (B.I.A. 1985) (refusing to find that a male taxi driver who
refused to participate in work stoppages was a member of a particular social group
because he could have changed the characteristics otherwise defining his group by
participating in the strike, and he therefore failed to meet the “gender plus”
requirement).
85. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 71 (implying that Ms. Gao’s situation may be even worse
than other paid-for brides because law enforcement was likely to enforce the marriage
over Ms. Gao’s objections, despite the fact that Ms. Gao would suffer painful and
continuing abuse once married).
86. See id. at 69 (comparing Ms. Gao’s particular social group to groups already
recognized as eligible for asylum, such as Mexican transvestites and African females
facing or opposing genital mutilation).
87. See IMO REPORT, supra note 50, at Part I (recognizing that immigrant women
often face abuse by their American fiancés and husbands because many men using
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While reauthorizing the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 2005,
Congress incorporated the International Marriage Broker Regulation Act
(IMBRA) to address incidences of domestic violence against, and human
trafficking in, a group of women classified as “mail-order brides.”88
VAWA and IMBRA’s legislative history recognized that women who lack
knowledge about domestic violence remedies available in the United
States, and whose American fiancés control their visas, often find
themselves locked in abusive relationships.89 IMBRA attempts to stop
persecution of mail-order brides by elevating their bargaining power such
that they can learn about a potential fiancé’s criminal charges and
convictions before coming to the United States.90
Ms. Gao’s position as a paid-for bride in an abusive relationship is
similar to the predicament of many abused mail-order brides protected by
IMBRA because Ms. Gao shares the immutable characteristic of gender
with mail-order brides.91 Moreover, Ms. Gao found herself in an abusive
relationship that she could not escape, just as Congress found that mailorder brides could not escape abusive marriages easily.92 Finally, Ms. Gao
also shared a similar political powerlessness with mail-order brides. Just as
pre-IMBRA mail-order brides had no one to champion their rights, no one
would stop the abuse Ms. Gao suffered because Chinese officials would, in
all likelihood, enforce her marriage to a violent man.93 Thus, the Supreme
mail-order bride services seek women they can control).
88. See id. (establishing the information and resources required to regulate
international marriage brokers); see also European Connections & Tours, Inc. v.
Gonzales, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (suggesting that many
immigrant women coming into the United States as mail-order brides often face abuse
by men they marry and lack the knowledge or power to contest the marriage or speak
out against the abuse).
89. See European Connections & Tours, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-63
(describing the class of women who suffer as mail-order brides and explaining that they
need protection because they are especially vulnerable due to their lack of familiarity
with the English language, U.S. laws, and customs).
90. See IMBRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1375a(d) (2006) (requiring American men to provide
“marriage brokers” with police records and other personal information so that the
brokers can turn that information over to potential wives who will then have
information on a potential mate before coming to the United States).
91. See Gao 440 F.3d at 70 (noting that Ms. Gao’s gender was but one
characteristic shared among the group of paid-for brides and indicating that her position
as a paid-for bride completed the “gender plus” requirement for classification in a
particular social group).
92. Compare id. at 71 (focusing on the fact that Ms. Gao should receive asylum
because she had tried unsuccessfully to relocate in China in order to escape her fiancé’s
abuse), with European Connections & Tours, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1366-67
(implying that mail-order brides needed protection because they were often locked into
abusive relationships with their fiancés or husbands).
93. Compare Gao, 440 F.3d at 71 (implying that Ms. Gao did not deserve the
treatment she suffered and so concluding her case in such a way that the law would
protect and remove her from a physically abusive environment), with European
Connections & Tours, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1367 (addressing mail-order-brides’ lack
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Court was inconsistent and unjust when it refused to recognize the
similarities between Ms. Gao and other women protected by Congress.94
D. The Second Circuit Rightly Refused to Uphold the BIA’s Decision
Because the Circuit’s “Substantial Evidence” Review Compelled a
Conclusion Contrary to that which the BIA Expressed in its Summary
Affirmation
The Second Circuit properly exercised substantial evidence review
because courts need not uphold BIA decisions that are not “supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as
a whole.”95 That the BIA’s affirmation of the IJ decision in Ms. Gao’s case
touched upon her particular social group in only a cursory fashion is
irrelevant, because the Second Circuit would have given the IJ’s decision
significant weight during substantial evidence review had the full record
actually warranted a denial of asylum.96 Thus, the Second Circuit did not
usurp an agency role by considering Ms. Gao’s membership in a particular
social group during substantial evidence review because the court
completed its legally-mandated function of reviewing agency fact-finding
to ensure that the agency conclusion comported with the record.97
Moreover, the Second Circuit exercised its substantial evidence review
in the same manner as many other federal courts. For example, in
Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, the Seventh Circuit prohibited any search for
new facts in the record, but rather it reviewed the record in its entirety to
determine whether undisputed evidence compelled a conclusion that the
applicant would face persecution in Eritrea based upon his Jehovah’s
Witness beliefs.98 Just as the court in Ghebremedhin found that the record
reflected the Eritrean military’s certain persecution of the applicant, Ms.
of knowledge as a lack of power and finding that mail-order brides deserved more
equal bargaining power with potential fiancés in order to preclude them from finding
themselves in abusive relationships).
94. See Keisler v. Hong Ying Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345, 345 (2007) (granting writ of
certiorari and ordering the Second Circuit to vacate its decision, which indicated the
Court’s failure to recognize that Ms. Gao’s position as an abused paid-for bride
necessitated the searching review that the Second Circuit conducted).
95. See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (incorporating an
older version of the INA into case law and implying that courts do not grant high
degrees of deference where a reasonable basis for the agency ruling is absent).
96. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 65-66 (explaining that substantial evidence review is
stricter than a clear-error standard of review because, absent substantial evidence to the
contrary, the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusions should control).
97. See id. at 66 (acknowledging that the court’s role does not extend to review of
external evidence upon which the BIA did not rely, but urging that substantial evidence
review is appropriate for contested factual issues).
98. See Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 241, 244 (holding that the court’s
authority extends to review and reversal of agency decisions that are either contrary to
law or cannot withstand substantial evidence review).
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Gao’s evidence showed she had a fear of future persecution upon return to
China because her abusive fiancé was likely to find her as he had in the
past.99 Moreover, similar to the Seventh Circuit’s finding that denial of
asylum to the applicant was patently unreasonable, rejecting Ms. Gao’s
asylum application also did not seem reasonable in light of the evidence
that she provided.100
Rather, Ms. Gao’s evidence illustrated that
widespread bride-trafficking in rural China affects an identifiable group of
women who cannot seek protection from the government because law
enforcement and other village authorities support the practice.101
Furthermore, just as the record in Ghebremedhin “compel[led] the
conclusion” that the applicant qualified for asylum, the Second Circuit
recognized that Ms. Gao presented “evidence [that] a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate” to support the conclusion that she was a member
of a particular social group: she presented a U.S. Department of State
Country Report that detailed bride-trafficking in China, extensive domestic
violence, and a widespread enforcement of forced marriages.102 Thus,
review of the evidence showed that, contrary to the IJ’s and BIA’s
decisions, Ms. Gao convincingly met the criteria for membership in a
particular social group because she suffered persecution based upon her
presence in a group of women who were forced into marriage.103

99. Compare id. (implying that BIA reconsideration was unnecessary where the
court could draw only one conclusion from the record), with Gao, 440 F.3d at 71
(concluding that the BIA’s decision that Ms. Gao could return to China was
unreasonable and unsupported by evidence because Ms. Gao had tried to hide in
another fishing village one hour away by boat from her own and still her fiancé located
her, stalked her, and threatened her and her family with violence if she refused to return
home with him).
100. Compare Ghebremedhin, 392 F.3d at 244 (finding denial of asylum to the
applicant was unreasonable because the applicant already was statutorily eligible for
asylum based upon religious persecution), with Gao, 440 F.3d at 65, 71 (finding Ms.
Gao’s fear of persecution persuasive because she demonstrated that her fiancé was badtempered, violent, physically abusive, controlling, vindictive, obsessed with gambling,
and had stalked her when she tried to escape him, harassed her family repeatedly, and
vandalized her family’s home).
101. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 71 (reviewing the record for substantial evidence and
reversing the decision of the BIA because the evidence presented by Ms. Gao
compelled a different conclusion from that rendered by the BIA).
102. See id. at 65-66, 71 (recognizing that where the evidence compels a completely
different conclusion from that of the BIA or IJ, the court need not afford the BIA’s
affirmation of the IJ decision Chevron or Skidmore deference).
103. See id. at 70-71 (recognizing that Ms. Gao could not change her sex and, as
such, was subject to persecution in the form of forced marriage because she lacked the
ability to refuse the marriage in a culture that condones marriage for money, regardless
of whether the marriage was forced upon the bride by her family or her economic
position).
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E. By Applying the Ordinary Remand Rule in Ms. Gao’s Case, the Supreme
Court Obscured When BIA Decisions Deserve Deference, and When the
Courts Should Apply the Rule, Thereby Creating Bad Precedent
The Supreme Court should have upheld the Second Circuit’s review of
Ms. Gao’s case based upon the decisions of other federal courts of appeals,
many of which refuse to institute the ordinary remand rule automatically.104
Problems of unpredictability and lack of uniformity regarding those
decisions are more likely to arise if the Supreme Court does not clarify the
rule’s application among circuits.105
Currently, three circuits hold that “rare circumstances” create an
exception to the ordinary remand rule whereby a reviewing federal court
can properly decide an issue that the BIA already has reviewed.106 For
example, unlike the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the rule as
a concept that permits remand, but does not require it. Instead, the Fifth
Circuit read the Supreme Court’s choice not to word the rule
“categorically” as a conscious act.107 According to the Fifth Circuit,
104. See, e.g., Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007)
(holding the ordinary remand rule inapplicable where the court decides the legal issue,
rather than the factual issue, of whether the asylum applicant had sufficiently alleged
errors by the BIA and supported them with pertinent authority); Almaghzar v.
Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2006) (refusing to apply the ordinary remand
rule where the BIA has already considered an issue before the court); Zhao v.
Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 310-11 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that a court can review a BIA
decision without intruding upon separation of powers when the BIA already had an
opportunity to review an issue first).
105. Compare Castaneda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2007)
(promoting the idea that agency expertise should always prevail because an agency has
more experience with the subject matter than a court of general jurisdiction), with
Ghebremedhin, 392 F.3d at 242-43 (refusing to allow agency expertise to trump review
of an agency decision that displays illogical reasoning or unsupported conclusions).
See also Legomsky, supra note 41, at 422-23, 425 (explaining that overall remand rates
for asylum adjudication cases range from less than two percent in the Fourth Circuit to
over thirty-six percent in the Seventh Circuit, and concluding that these disparities are
alarming because they allow similarly situated people to be treated very differently).
106. Compare Castaneda-Castillo, 488 F.3d at 24-25 (explaining that, although the
BIA mischaracterized evidence presented by a Peruvian police officer seeking asylum
and reached unsupportable and ill-reasoned conclusions regarding his possible
participation in a massacre of a terrorist cell, remand to the agency to cure the errors is
the normal course of action), with Almaghzar, 457 F.3d at 923 (enunciating the
principle that the court could deny a Convention Against Torture claim because the
BIA had already reviewed the applicant’s claim and found, as the court did, that the
testimony was not credible), and Zhao, 404 F.3d at 305, 310-11 (adopting the idea that
remand was not necessary because the BIA already decided the issue, albeit in a
suspect manner, regarding changed circumstances and their effect on persecution of
Falun Gong members), and Ghebremedhin, 392 F.3d at 242-43 (finding that the court
did not usurp the BIA’s role when it reversed a denial of asylum to an Eritrean
Jehovah’s Witness given that the applicant presented evidence proving persecution of
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Eritrea).
107. See Zhao, 404 F.3d at 310-11 (refusing to read the ordinary remand rule as a
categorical imperative and so finding that an exception to the rule exists where the BIA
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therefore, the Second Circuit would not have been required to remand Ms.
Gao’s issue to the BIA at all, because the BIA had already made a
decision.108 Thus, the Second Circuit’s ruling would not impinge on the
BIA’s authority to review the issues in Ms. Gao’s case concerning her
membership in a particular social group and the availability of refuge in
China.109
Furthermore, the refusal of many circuit courts to apply the ordinary
remand rule suggests criticism of the broad deference granted to the BIA
under the rule.110 With an overzealous focus on remand, the rule undercuts
the ability of the courts to exercise judicial review.111 Circuit courts
recognize the impropriety of limiting judicial review, particularly when
faced with a glaring agency error, such as the patently unreasonable
conclusion that Ms. Gao did not deserve refugee status.112
In
Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, for example, the Seventh Circuit similarly
refused to apply the ordinary remand rule to a BIA summary affirmation
that contravened settled law and displayed an unreasoned decision, because
the Eritrean applicant faced likely persecution for his refusal to join the
Eritrean army due to his religious beliefs.113 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit
considered a situation procedurally similar to Ms. Gao’s in Almaghzar v.
Gonzales; there the court ruled there was no need to remand a Convention
Against Torture (CAT) claim to the BIA as the BIA already had reviewed
has already passed judgment on an issue).
108. See id. (articulating that the ordinary remand rule is not mandatory in a case
where the BIA has made a decision, particularly because the court’s ruling does not
usurp powers reserved for the BIA).
109. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, Keisler v. Hong
Ying Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345 (2007) (reasoning that, where the BIA voluntarily reviews a
decision in a cursory manner, the Supreme Court should not strip a circuit court of
jurisdiction to review the adequacy and legality of the decision).
110. See Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007) (criticizing required
deference when the BIA has already nonchalantly reviewed an issue, and reminding
administrative agencies that deference is earned, not automatically granted).
111. See id. at 820 (suggesting that justice requires judicial review because recently
the court has reviewed suspect credibility decisions made by an overworked and
understaffed IJ and BIA, and also reporting that two-thirds of the judicial reversals of
asylum decisions in the first two months of 2006 involved review of credibility
determinations).
112. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 71 (questioning the BIA’s decision to affirm the IJ’s
denial of asylum because Ms. Gao’s membership in a particular social group seemed to
be a reasonable classification, as she would certainly face persecution in the form of a
forced marriage in China and she also needed protection from her abusive fiancé); see
also Legomsky, supra note 41, at 463 (defending judicial review of agency decisions
because the criticism of “generalist judges” deciding specialized issues ignores that
judicial perspectives complement and add to the perspectives of specialist agencies
such that judicial review gradually catalyzes an evolution in legal doctrine
disseminated amongst multiple courts).
113. See Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that
a Jehovah’s Witness presented sufficient evidence that compelled a conclusion
completely different from one decided by the BIA).
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evidence concerning the general practice of torture in Yemen.114 The Ninth
Circuit, therefore, rightly took jurisdiction over the CAT claim because,
though the BIA had not done so, it had an opportunity to address the
likelihood of torture specific to the applicant.115
Had the Supreme Court recognized the practices of these circuits, it most
likely would have upheld the Second Circuit’s decision to direct a BIA
finding that Ms. Gao belonged to an asylum-qualifying group.116 Using the
Seventh Circuit’s standard of refusal to remand where the BIA’s decision
was contrary to law or not supported by the record on the whole, the
Second Circuit rightly exercised jurisdiction over Ms. Gao’s case because
the evidence supported a grant, rather than a denial, of asylum.117
Following the Ninth Circuit’s standard of refusal to remand where the BIA
already has reviewed the contested issue, the Second Circuit did not need to
remand to the BIA because the BIA already had the chance to review her
membership in a particular social group.118 The Second Circuit, like sister
circuits, prudently exercised judicial review by refusing to apply the rule,
thereby better protecting Ms. Gao’s human rights and bringing finality to a
time-sensitive issue more quickly than if it were to force the case back onto
the BIA’s overloaded docket.119

114. See Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2006) (supporting the
proposition that, where the agency already has reviewed an issue generally, the court
may review the issue as applied specifically to the applicant).
115. See id. (explaining that where the BIA has already reviewed the issue before
the court, the ordinary remand rule does not apply because the rule is meant for
situations where the BIA has not yet reviewed an issue and so has not yet engaged in its
front-end fact-finding role).
116. See Gao, 440 F.3d at 71 (echoing the reasoning of other circuits by refusing to
remand Ms. Gao’s case to the BIA because the BIA affirmation of the IJ decision was
against the weight of the evidence and the BIA had already exercised its opportunity to
review Ms. Gao’s claim).
117. See id. (arguing that Ms. Gao’s evidence compelled a grant, rather than a
denial, of asylum because Ms. Gao’s evidence illustrated that government officials or
village authorities were likely to force her to marry her abusive fiancé were she to
return to China).
118. See id. (denying remand to the BIA because the BIA already had the chance to
rule on Ms. Gao’s claim in a more thorough manner, but chose to waive that
opportunity in favor of a summary affirmation of an IJ opinion).
119. See Statistical Year Book, supra note 17, at A2 (illustrating that BIA case
receipts have increased by fourteen percent to almost 40,000 cases from 2002 to 2006,
though case completions have decreased twelve percent during the same time); see also
Legomsky, supra note 41, at 418-20 (implying that attempts to streamline the BIA
review process through new regulations, which made single-member affirmations
without opinion the norm, have actually hampered the quality and thoroughness of BIA
decisions because the number of BIA decisions reviewed by the courts surged
astronomically after implementation of the regulations and, additionally, courts of
appeal have issued numerous, severely critical comments on the quality of IJ and BIA
opinions).
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F. The Supreme Court Must Review Application of the Ordinary Remand
Rule so that Use of the Rule Does Not Conflict with the Federal Judicial
Review Protections or International Humanitarian Duties
The Supreme Court should modify the ordinary remand rule by
elucidating further when judicial review of asylum cases is appropriate
because such review often serves as an important check on unbridled
agency discretion.120 At present, the rule disregards that a discretionary
reading of an adjudicatory fact-finding is not automatic, particularly when
substantial evidence review produces serious questions about the
adjudicatory findings.121 A rule that demands freedom from judicial review
ignores the possibility that agencies make mistakes and the court often
serves as an avenue to rectify them.122 Thus, the Supreme Court should
provide for judicial review where the BIA already has benefited from
consideration of the record because such guidance would provide more
incentive for the BIA to proffer decisions that are grounded in evidence and
that comport with a policy that better recognizes gender-based asylum
claims, like Ms. Gao’s.123
Finally, the Supreme Court must interpret the ordinary remand rule
narrowly to require agency compliance with existing humanitarian duties,
such as the Vienna Convention or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees (“the Protocol”).124 At present, invocation of the rule sends a
120. See, e.g., Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that
judicial review often rectifies agency error, particularly when an IJ decision displaying
insensitivity to the demeanor of a foreigner is a “disturbing feature” of immigration
law); see also Legomsky, supra note 41, at 463 (implying that judicial review promotes
accountability between branches because judicial review recognizes the position of
others in society, litigants and legislators alike).
121. See Kadia, 501 F.3d at 820-21 (analyzing deference to an agency based upon
the convention that agencies know more about the subjects delegated to them than the
courts do, but also acknowledging that any expertise derives from constant contact with
their delegated subject matter, which is not always the determining factor in an asylum
case); see also Gao, 440 F.3d at 65 (stating that, while the court gives great weight to
the determination of the initial fact-finder and therefore rarely disturbs adjudicatory
fact-findings, review can be more searching when certain cases require it).
122. See Ghebremedhin v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2004) (reversing
the IJ’s and BIA’s denial of asylum eligibility for an Eritrean applicant because he
provided sufficient evidence that the government persecuted Jehovah’s Witnesses, and
holding that the decisions from the agency were manifestly contrary to law); see also
Kadia, 501 F.3d at 819-20 (reminding agencies that deference is not automatic, nor
always appropriate, because judicial review promises oversight of agency decisions and
correction of agency errors).
123. See Vienna Declaration, supra note 10, at pt. I, ¶ 18 (publishing humanitarian
norms that have become key parts of international law and suggesting that the human
rights of women receive a more intense focus).
124. See id. (expressing concern for discrimination and violence suffered by women
globally, and adopting as a priority program of action the eradication of discriminatory
practices against women and girls); U.N. Refugee Protocol, supra note 53, at 33
(mandating that signatories cooperate with the United Nations in order to assess and
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woman like Ms. Gao back to an abusive, forced marriage and disregards
obligations the United States acceded to by signing the Protocol.125 By
signing on to the Protocol, the United States assumed responsibility for
coordinating with the international community to protect refugees with a
well-founded fear of persecution.126 Yet in Ms. Gao’s case, and in many
others, the United States has ignored that obligation and instead used the
ordinary remand rule to promote isolationist and xenophobic tendencies by
refusing to allow review of unreasonable BIA decisions.127 For example,
the BIA and the courts have battled over remand and re-remand three times
over the past thirteen years for one single claim—that of Rodi Alvarado,
who sought asylum based upon a fear of her husband’s vicious and
repeated abuse and her inability to find safe haven in Guatemala because
Guatemalan authorities would not intervene in domestic disputes.128 Ms.
Gao must not suffer Ms. Alvarado’s fate.129 One woman trapped in the
legal system is one woman too many.
G. Congress Should Explain how Gender-Based Harms Relate to Asylum
Claims, such that an Amorphous Definition of “Particular Social Group”
Cannot Bar Protection for Women Fleeing their Abusers
Congress could forestall some applications of the ordinary remand rule
by establishing concrete factors that the BIA must use to determine whether
asylum-seekers like Ms. Gao belong to a “particular social group,”
according to the INA.130 For gender-based asylum claims in particular, the
ameliorate the condition of refugees and to implement and enforce laws relating to
refugees).
125. See U.N. Refugee Protocol, supra note 53, at 5-7 (finding that the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Convention”) and the Protocol had
fundamental significance for the protection, welfare, and safety of refugees and for
establishing standards requiring freedom of race, religion, etc., for refugees).
126. See id. at 33 (requiring that states implement the Protocol in good faith by
means such as alerting the U.N. Secretary-General to any laws and regulations adopted
to ensure compliance with the Protocol); see also Gómez, supra note 54, at 961-62
(explaining that the Protocol accepted the Convention, which mandated that states
could not expel or return a refugee to a place where circumstances would imperil his or
her life or freedom).
127. See Keisler v. Hong Ying Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345, 345 (2007) (remanding Ms.
Gao’s case to a BIA that is, based upon its past ruling, more likely to uphold her
deportation to China and less likely to afford Ms. Gao asylum protections from her
abusive fiancé).
128. See Musalo, supra note 54, at 123, 126 (arguing that final disposition of Ms.
Alvarado’s case suffers based upon a lack of guidance to the courts regarding how
domestic violence relates to asylum eligibility).
129. See id. at 125-27 (lamenting that Ms. Alvarado’s case has been pending before
the BIA since 2005). Presently, Ms. Gao and Ms. Alvarado are very much alike, as
Ms. Gao’s case also has been languishing in the BIA’s docket since her 2007 loss in the
Supreme Court. E-mail from Carole Neville, Partner, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal
LLP, to Brenna Finn (July 28, 2008, 15:10:54 EST) (on file with author).
130. See Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, supra note 53 (distinguishing
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Court must not bar substantial evidence review of particular social group
classifications, especially because the human rights of litigants are at
stake.131
Furthermore, guidelines would assist IJs and the BIA to apply the law
uniformly to gender-based asylum claims, rather than ignoring those claims
because the concept of particular social group is ill-defined.132 One
suggestion is that the United States model its asylum laws after Canada’s
Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related
Persecution, which address relationships between gender, persecution, and
membership in particular social groups and also redefine recognized harms
to include forced marriage, domestic violence, and infanticide.133 Asylum
jurisprudence in the United States should recognize these harms as well, so
that Ms. Gao and others like her are not limited to seeking protection from
our northern neighbor alone.134

Canada from the United States because Canadian gender guidelines clearly relate
gender-based violence to persecution of a particular social group, while such
regulations do not exist in the United States); Gómez, supra note 54, at 986-87
(decrying the United States’ so-called protection of abused female refugees based upon
its failure to solidify acceptance of gender-based asylum claims, as countries like
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia have done, and criticizing its uneven
application of unpublished gender regulations and guidelines, where they exist at all).
131. See Vienna Declaration, supra note 10, pt. I, ¶ 18 (striving to promote and
protect women’s rights as an integral part of universal human rights); Copelon, supra
note 54, at 293-95, 366 (applauding international recognition of official and private
gender-based violence as a human rights concern in the Vienna Declaration, and
arguing that international and domestic law can and should illuminate the evil of
gender-based violence by punishing public and private gender violence).
132. See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (using “particular social group” to
define a possible qualification for refugee status, but failing to define the term
properly); Gómez, supra note 54, at 976-77 (arguing that greater understanding of the
harms stemming from gender-based asylum claims will allow the governmental bodies
deciding those claims to better protect women fleeing their abusers, as well as more
uniformly reach gender-based asylum claim decisions).
133. See Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, supra note 53 (publishing
guidelines wherein Canada interprets the definition of refugee as necessarily providing
protection to women who demonstrate a well-founded fear of gender-related
persecution and explaining that the Immigration and Refugee Board intended for the
guidelines to streamline and unify the treatment of claimants); Gómez, supra note 54,
at 978-79 (proffering Canada’s gender-based jurisprudence as a guide for change in the
United States because Canada, in 1993, became the first country to issue guidelines that
specifically address gender-based claims by interpreting the Convention on Relating
the Status of Refugees as providing protection for women who demonstrate a wellfounded fear of gender-related persecution).
134. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d. 62, 71 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, Keisler v. Hong
Ying Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345 (2007) (comporting with humanitarian duties to protect
abused women by refusing to condone the IJ’s downplaying of the domestic violence
Ms. Gao suffered); see also Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, supra note 53
(basing analysis upon Canadian guidelines, Ms. Gao likely would have been offered
protection because Canadian guidelines allow the linkage between class and
persecution to be shown by fear resulting from discrimination on the grounds of
gender, including acts of violence by state or non-state actors).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Hong Ying Gao is a woman seeking safety and solace and standing in
her way is a rule that stubbornly adheres to a xenophobic immigration
policy and is inconsistent with domestic protections of judicial review and
humanitarian norms that seek to curtail violence against women.135 Ms.
Gao, and all other paid-for brides who face involuntary, governmentenforced marriage, saw the United States as a land of promise and
protection; if the ordinary remand rule serves to send Ms. Gao and women
like her back to a world of physical and mental abuse, the reputation of the
United States will diminish with each innocent turned away.136 Thus, the
United States must not assist a practice that denies and destroys a woman’s
power and, more abhorrently, devalues and dehumanizes a woman’s
identity.137
The failure to recognize the loss in reputational capital following
invocation of the ordinary remand rule in the wrong situations is most
astonishing.138 The Supreme Court erred by applying the rule to Ms. Gao’s
case because the BIA already had an opportunity to review her membership
in a particular social group and blindly upheld the IJ’s decision that Ms.
Gao did not qualify for asylum.139 Where an agency has an opportunity to
speak to a matter, and the agency rules in a manner wholly inconsistent
with the record, courts should feel compelled to address the egregious error
before them.140
Further, the ordinary remand rule suggests internal conflict in domestic

135. See Richey, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that Ms. Gao’s case represented a civil
rights case because money, and not the bride’s wishes, is a crucial component of
arranged marriages in China, such that a court would likely enforce the marriage
despite the fears or safety of the woman, and concluding that, because the power of the
Chinese state could bear down on Ms. Gao to enforce the marriage, she is a refugee
who deserves protection under U.S. asylum law).
136. See Gómez, supra note 54, at 986-87 (criticizing the United States for its
hypocrisy in touting itself as a watchdog for human rights while implicitly sanctioning
human rights violations by failing to better uphold the values it professes to protect).
137. See Copelon, supra note 54, at 304 (explaining that domestic violence is a
systemic practice in many societies that fosters patriarchal control of women by
perpetuating a woman’s dependence on her abuser and defining her as her abuser’s
property).
138. See Legomsky, supra note 41, at 420 (adding that IJ and BIA members have
already lost credibility and support based upon damning reviews of their decisions by
courts of appeals).
139. See, e.g., Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that remand to the BIA is not necessary where the BIA has already expressed
an opinion on an issue because the requirement that the BIA act as the initial reviewer
has been satisfied).
140. See Legomsky, supra note 41, at 430 (implying that a narrowing of judicial
review opportunities in asylum cases is dangerous because the courts provide a
deserving applicant with a last opportunity to seek justice).
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affairs by reorganizing separation of powers within the government.141 An
overzealous reliance on an administrative agency’s ability to make class
determinations threatens more than immigration law; it chips away at the
larger struggle for rights recognition in all discriminated-against groups by
undermining a court’s authority to make class determinations.142 Most
importantly, the United States cannot sustain the ordinary remand rule as a
time-tested principle of administrative law while hiding behind those tenets
of law, hampering recognition of women’s rights, and forcing women back
into the arms of their abusers.143

141. See id. at 463 (implying a separation of powers argument against decreasing
judicial review because obstruction of judicial review aggrandizes an agency’s
authority while encroaching upon that of the judicial branch, particularly in cases
where judicial review protects the accountability and quality of agency decisions).
142. See INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (illustrating dangerous
reliance on agency expertise concerning classifying people in particular social groups
because the agency wrested jurisdiction and authority from the court, such that the
court lost power to make class determinations without input from an agency whose
expertise is questionable).
143. See Gómez, supra note 54, at 961-64 (condemning the United States for
ignoring international humanitarian duties because those duties require that a State
accept women and girls fleeing abuse).
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